Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Using Investor-State Dispute Settlement to Strengthen Environmental Law by Chiong-Martinson, Ai-Li
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 3 
8-31-2017 
Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
Using Investor-State Dispute Settlement to Strengthen 
Environmental Law 
Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson 
Seattle University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel 
 Part of the Education Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chiong-Martinson, Ai-Li (2017) "Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Using 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement to Strengthen Environmental Law," Seattle Journal of Environmental 
Law: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel/vol7/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal of Environmental 
Law by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Using Investor-
State Dispute Settlement to Strengthen Environmental Law 
Cover Page Footnote 
Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson graduated from Seattle University School of Law magna cum laude in May 2017, 
with a focused study in international law. Ms. Chiong-Martinson served as the Managing Editor for the 
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law. She would like to thank her family and friends for their unrelenting 
support and encouragement, as she pursued her interest in international business litigation and 
arbitration. 




Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: Using Investor-State Dispute Settlement to 
Strengthen Environmental Law 
Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson† 
ABSTRACT 
The highly publicized Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement 
has reignited a long-running debate between environmentalists and free 
trade advocates about the impacts of the investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) system on the global economy and environmental preservation. 
The ISDS provision potentially gives foreign investors the right to chal-
lenge domestic regulations intending to protect the environment if those 
regulations discriminate against foreign investors and result in substan-
tial monetary loss to the investors’ property. Critics of the TPP argue 
that we should learn from the troubling legacy of the North American 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which, according to critics, overwhelmingly 
favored investors over states and domestic environmental concerns. Giv-
en the similarities between the TPP and NAFTA, critics argue that the 
TPP will similarly favor the rights of foreign investors over environmen-
tal regulations. Proponents of ISDS argue that the ISDS system as a 
whole provides much needed recourse to investors, fosters economic de-
velopment, and strengthens the rule of law. Furthermore, many propo-
nents argue the TPP provides far greater protections than NAFTA to 
host-state governments regulating for the public good, and, nonetheless, 
NAFTA jurisprudence is not as investor-friendly as critics contend. The 
purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between ISDS and 
environmental regulations pursued by host-states in an effort to deter-
mine whether member countries can realistically enact legislation to 
protect the environment when they are signatories to the TPP. 
 
                                                
†) Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson graduated from Seattle University School of Law magna cum 
laude in May 2017, with a focused study in international law. Ms. Chiong-Martinson served as the 
Managing Editor for the Seattle Journal of Environmental Law. She would like to thank her family 
and friends for their unrelenting support and encouragement, as she pursued her interest in interna-
tional business litigation and arbitration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 5, 2015, following years of negotiations, the United 
States and eleven other Pacific Rim nations reached a final agreement on 
arguably the largest regional trade agreement in history – the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).1 The TPP is one of the most ambitious free 
trade agreements ever signed, aiming to foster trade, boost domestic 
growth, and forge closer relationships on economic policies and regula-
                                                
1 Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-
deal-is-reached.html?_r=0. 
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tion between the twelve participating member countries.2 Although trade 
ministers have reached an agreement on the trade deal, this is only the 
first step in a looming and complex political fight; the twelve nations 
have two years to ratify or reject the pact, and the agreement will face 
months of scrutiny in Congress.3 While numerous aspects of the TPP 
have become the subject of great contention, there is one facet of the 
agreement that has received an exorbitant amount of criticism – the in-
vestor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provision.4 In short, ISDS is a le-
gal mechanism that gives foreign investors the right to challenge gov-
ernment regulations by suing host-state governments through ad hoc ar-
bitration proceedings, rather than domestic administrative and judicial 
channels, on the grounds that the government violated the rights guaran-
teed to the investor under a particular trade agreement or treaty.5 At its 
most basic level, ISDS enables a foreign investor to sue the government 
of a country where the investor does business if the government is signa-
tory to a trade agreement that includes an ISDS provision, and the gov-
ernment implements regulations that violate the investor’s rights as nego-
tiated and established in the agreement.  
Although ISDS mechanisms already exist in many other trade 
and investment treaties, the highly publicized TPP agreement has reignit-
ed a long-running debate between environmentalists and advocates of 
free trade about the impacts of ISDS on the global economy and envi-
ronmental preservation. Both critics and proponents of ISDS tend to con-
cede that the ISDS system has opened the door for corporations to sue 
state governments over newly enacted regulatory frameworks, such as 
those aimed at environmental protection and sustainability.6 Where the 
critics and proponents differ, however, is in their assessment of the po-
tential costs or benefits this modern right to arbitration will have on for-
eign investors, host-state governments, and the environment in general. 
The ISDS debate became a feature of mainstream political discourse fol-
lowing the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in the ‘90s, and has recently been revived on account of the 
TPP and the 2016 presidential election. As governments and policy mak-
                                                
2 TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
32498715. 
3 Mara Liasson, Obama Begins Sales Pitch To Congress On Trans-Pacific Partnership, NPR 
(Oct. 06, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/06/446370835/obama-begins-sales-pitch-to-congress-
on-trans-pacific-partnership. 
4 Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Unconstitutional?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 23, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389/. 
5 Lisa Johnson, Lisa Sachs and Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, 
CCSI Policy Paper, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law (May 
2015), available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-
Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf. 
6 Tamara L. Slater, Investor-State Arbitration and Domestic Environmental Protection, 14 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 131 (2015). 
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ers become increasingly focused on protecting the environment, the 
number of environmental regulations that impact foreign investors will 
most likely intensify, resulting in an increase in ISDS claims brought by 
investors against host-states.7 For all of these reasons, the ISDS debate 
has perhaps never been as relevant as it is today.  
While there are strong arguments to be made from either side of 
the ISDS debate, much of the discussion surrounding the legitimacy of 
ISDS is based on somewhat skewed and limited information, rather than 
facts and balanced representations. On one hand, critics argue that the 
inclusion of ISDS provisions in trade agreements allow multinational 
corporations to override government policy and undermine state sover-
eignty.8 Critics of the ISDS system often identify ISDS cases brought 
under the NAFTA where tribunals found in favor of foreign investors 
challenging the host-state’s environmental regulations as evidence of the 
dangerous impacts ISDS can have on the environment.9 According to 
critics, the ISDS provision in the TPP mirrors the provision in NAFTA, 
suggesting that the TPP will similarly empower foreign investors to 
freely challenge host-state environmental regulations.10  On the other 
hand, according to ISDS proponents, ISDS does not limit the ability of 
governments to regulate, but rather gives foreign investors much needed 
redress if they are unfairly treated, representing a major advance in the 
fair treatment of foreign businesses and the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes.11 Rather than abdicating sovereignty, proponents of ISDS argue 
that entering into trade and investment agreements is an exercise of the 
sovereign’s right to decide which obligations they wish to include in a 
treaty.12  
The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between 
ISDS, as a mechanism of free trade, and environmental regulations pur-
sued by host-states in an effort to determine whether member countries 
can realistically enact legislation to protect the environment when they 
are signatories to the TPP. The overall utility of ISDS, or conversely the 
potential dangers it poses to the environment, depends on the resolution 
of a few essential questions. First, how should we assess whether ISDS is 
                                                
7 Id. 
8 James Surowiecki, Trade-Agreement Troubles, NEW YORKER (Jun. 22, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/trade-agreement-troubles. 
9 Setting the Record Straight: Debunking Ten Common Defenses of Controversial Investor-
State Corporate Privileges, PUBLICCITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/documents/ustr-isds-
response.pdf. 
10 Mark Weisbrot, Lessons from NAFTA for the TPP, HUFFINGTON POST: THE WORLD POST 
(Oct. 22, 2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weisbrot/lessons-from-nafta-for-
th_b_8315512.html. 
11 Scott Miller and Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check 
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Jan. 2015), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/150116_Miller_InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf.  
12 Morrison, supra note 4.   
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an effective tool for balancing foreign investment and environmental 
protection? Second, what rights does the TPP preserve for investors and 
for governments intending to pass environmental legislation? Lastly, 
does or can the TPP protect the interest of both? Bringing together both 
sides of the ISDS argument, this paper concludes that the ISDS provision 
contained in the TPP has some significant differences from NAFTA, and 
that NAFTA investment arbitration jurisprudence isn’t necessarily as 
pro-investor as some critics might believe. Given these determinations, it 
is the opinion of the author that the ISDS provision in the TPP actually 
has the potential to strengthen host-state environmental regulations, but 
only if there are a few significant reforms made to the existing system.  
First, with the aim of enhancing legal certainty and predictabil-
ity, the international community should make serious efforts to harmo-
nize the rules governing international investment arbitration. Second, in 
the area of procedural reforms, foreign investors should always be re-
quired to carry the burden of paying the host-state’s legal fees if the arbi-
trators decide the case is frivolous or rule in the government’s favor; this 
would discourage investors from pursuing frivolous claims against host-
states and strengthen the utility of investment arbitration as a more eco-
nomical and efficient alternative to litigation. Finally, there must be 
greater transparency so arbitral decisions can begin to create precedent, 
or customary international law, which would provide the current system 
a framework for more consistent investor arbitration jurisprudence. With 
these procedural and substantive reforms, the ISDS provision in the TPP 
has the potential to protect and strengthen each member state’s ability to 
enact or maintain environmental regulations. 
 This article seeks to facilitate a robust, even-handed, and careful 
discussion about ISDS and the environment, with a particular emphasis 
on the foreseeable benefits and dangers posed to future environmental 
regulations pursued by parties to the TPP. Parts II through V of this arti-
cle establish the overarching historical and legal framework of the ISDS 
system, focusing specifically on NAFTA and the TPP, in an effort to 
contextualize the current ISDS debate. Part II explores the rise of ISDS 
and establishes the theoretical and doctrinal framework for ISDS that 
arose out of its historical context. Part III examines the legal framework 
applicable to ISDS, which consists of international trade law, investor 
arbitration, and free trade agreements. Building upon the legal frame-
work, Part IV looks specifically at the Investment Chapters and ISDS 
provisions in both NAFTA and the TPP, comparing the important simi-
larities and difference between the agreements. Part V shifts focus to en-
vironmental law disputes that were brought under the auspices of 
NAFTA in an effort to establish the current state of NAFTA arbitration 
jurisprudence.  
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Having established the historical and legal foundation for the 
TPP’s ISDS provision, Part VI gets to the substance of the ISDS debate, 
summarizing the arguments for and against the ISDS system, consolidat-
ing the most compelling arguments, and proposing specific reforms that 
may potentially enable the ISDS system to actually strengthen environ-
mental reforms and free trade. 
I. BACKGROUND TO ISDS 
In the 1980s and ‘90s, foreign-direct investment by private sector 
corporations emerged as a dominant source of capital for developing 
countries and remains one of the leading sources of economic activity in 
our increasingly borderless world.13 As global economic activity has con-
tinued to expand, resulting in larger levels of international investment 
activity, international investment law has evolved into an increasingly 
relevant body of law for both the public and private sectors.14 One of the 
most significant developments within the quickly expanding area of in-
ternational investment law was the emergence of a variety of trade 
agreements seeking to promote foreign direct investment by providing 
foreign investors with greater security and transparency, such as multi-
lateral “free trade” agreements formed between multiple countries and 
bilateral investment treaties formed between two countries. International 
investment treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, offer substantive 
investment rights to corporations and contain provisions requiring states 
to arbitrate substantive violations, commonly known as ISDS provisions.  
ISDS provisions enable foreign investors to file claims against 
governments in an international arbitration forum, as long as the investor 
is covered by a trade agreement between the investor’s home country and 
the host country that includes an ISDS provision.15 Perhaps the most 
well-known ISDS provision is found in the Investment Chapter of 
NAFTA (hereinafter Chapter 11), which specifically identifies the mini-
mum standards for treatment of investors, enables corporations to sue 
host-state governments for laws or judicial decisions that infringe upon 
their rights, and establishes procedures for ISDS arbitration.16 The text of 
Chapter 11 is largely reflected in both the TPP and the Transatlantic 
                                                
13 Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Ad-
dressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf. 
14 Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 13, 18 (2014). 
15 Slater, supra note 6, at 133.  
16 Charles N. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 48 (2001).  
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Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)17 that is currently being nego-
tiated.  
Historically, investors had few options for resolving disputes 
arising from lost profits caused by government activity.18 Prior to ISDS, 
the options available to investors were generally quite limited; the inves-
tor could accept lost profits as a cost of doing business, obtain political 
risk insurance, or rely on its home state to invoke its diplomatic rights on 
the investor’s behalf.19 In essence, prior to the emergence of ISDS, dis-
putes involving government regulations and the resulting decrease in the 
value of property owned by foreign investors were treated as domestic 
conflicts.20 Against this unsatisfactory backdrop, states and investors be-
gan using ISDS provisions to permit international arbitration of interna-
tional investment law obligations.  
In theory, ISDS was intended to benefit both host-states and for-
eign investors by leveling the investment playing field and fostering the 
neutral adjudication of investment disputes in a manner designed to min-
imize commercial risk and political risk, while maximizing the rule of 
law.21 Through the establishment of a trans-national system for dispute 
resolution, foreign investors were able to avoid the potential difficulties 
they might face in a host-state domestic court system, such as ineffective 
domestic judicial systems or political influence.22 Essentially, at its in-
ception, the net objective of the ISDS system was to encourage foreign 
investment by protecting the rights of foreign investors and shielding 
host-states from incurring liability.23  
The procedural qualities of the ISDS arbitration system are quite 
straightforward. Trade agreements that include ISDS provisions provide 
clear dispute resolution rights to foreign investors, such as the right to 
binding arbitration. In general, trade agreement with ISDS provisions 
include certain jurisdictional prerequisites that must be met before an 
investor is permitted to bring a claim against a host-state to a tribunal.24 
For example, most trade or investment agreements require an investor to 
first attempt to amicably resolve the dispute and comply with the proper 
                                                
17 USTR, White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
(June 2013), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip. 
18 Franck, supra note 14, at 19. 
19 Id. 
20 Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’S Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical 
Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J.  465, 478-79 (2013).  
21 Franck, supra note 14, at 20. 
22 William Park & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: 
NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (2003).  
23 Franck, supra note 14, at 20.  
24 Id. at 22. 
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notification requirements for instigating a dispute before the investor 
may bring an ISDS claim against a state.25  
The substantive qualities of trade agreements involve promises 
from states to foreign investors that investors will receive certain mini-
mal treatment, such as the right to freedom from expropriation and dis-
crimination, and guarantees of fair and equitable treatment.26 These 
rights are explicitly stated in the trade agreement, usually in the agree-
ment’s Investment Chapter, and are protected through the agreement’s 
requirement that host states must refrain from violating the investor’s 
substantive treaty rights. When an investor believes the host-state has 
violated its rights, the trade agreement permits direct redress against the 
host state through the ISDS mechanism if the challenged government 
action or regulation fails to meet certain standards of treatment required 
under the agreement and results in economic harm to the investor.27 In 
sum, a cause of action brought under the ISDS provision of a trade 
agreement generally involves an investor’s claim that the host state vio-
lated the investor’s protected rights, and the violation caused monetary 
damage to the investor.  
Before delving directly into the legal framework in which ISDS 
is situated, it is important to note that the ISDS system implicates various 
bodies of international and domestic law. While it is more straightfor-
ward to evaluate the ISDS system through one lens rather than many, 
whether it be from the perspective of environmentalists or trade advo-
cates, the unique positioning of the ISDS system at the intersection of 
various bodies of law makes this almost impossible. Therefore, in con-
tinuing to build the ISDS framework as the foundation for the ISDS de-
bate, the following three sections discuss ISDS from three important and 
interrelated standpoints: Part III discusses international trade law, free 
trade agreements, and investment arbitration; Part IV compares the In-
vestment Chapters of NAFTA and the TPP; and Part V shifts to envi-
ronmental law and NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence.  
                                                
25 Id. at 20. 
26 Joseph Stiglitz, In 2016, let’s hope for better trade agreements – the death of TPP, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/10/in-2016-better-trade-
agreements-trans-pacific-partnership. 
27 Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of In-
vestor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INSTITUTE (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge-
negotiations-investor-state. 
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II. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. International Trade Law and Free Trade Agreements 
On October 30, 1947, twenty-three countries signed the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is considered to be the 
moment at which modern international trade law was first codified.28 The 
GATT was the governing document for international trade until the par-
ties to the GATT established the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
incorporated the GATT therein.29  The ultimate purpose of the WTO was 
to provide uniform trade laws, aid in resolving trade disputes, and to fa-
cilitate global trade.30 Thus, to avoid disputes and assure uniformity, the 
WTO requires that all members treat other members with “most favored 
nation” status, meaning the lowest tariff rate one WTO member gives 
any country is the tariff rate that all WTO members shall receive.31 There 
was one important exception to the “most favored nation” requirement 
explicitly written into the WTO regime – the specific exception for con-
tracting parties to avoid the “most favored nation” requirement when 
entering into free trade agreements.32 Under the WTO, free trade agree-
ments are effectively permitted to allow for preferential treatment among 
contracting countries.  
The WTO’s allowance for preferential treatment in free trade 
agreements resulted in a rapid increase in the number of free trade 
agreements, growing international unrest about the terms of these agree-
ments, and the rise of ISDS provisions. As of June 2014, 585 regional 
trade agreements have been reported to the WTO, with 379 in force.33 As 
of 2012, there were nearly 3,200 bilateral trade agreements, and a com-
parable increase in multilateral trade agreements.34 While some commen-
tators maintain that free trade agreements provide stability for commer-
cial transactions, many of the recently negotiated free trade agreements 
have sparked major protests by activists concerned about labor rights, 
environmental sustainability, exploitation of developing nations, and a 
range of other social issues.35  
                                                
28 Raj Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 641-42 
(LEXISNEXIS, 3d ed. 2008).  
29 Id. at 607.  
30 What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
31 Bhala, supra note 29, at Chapter 11.  
32 According to GATT Article XXIV, “the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as 
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
…” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 1583, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm. 
33 Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/htm. 
34 Slater, supra note 6, at 136. 
35 Id. 
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B. Investment Arbitration: ISDS Provisions and Procedures 
The applicability of international trade law to investment dis-
putes is expressly derived from the terms of a free trade agreement and 
inclusion of an ISDS provision. For example, imagine that the United 
States and Chile are parties to a multilateral trade agreement that con-
tains an ISDS provision, such as the TPP or NAFTA. An American com-
pany decides to invest in a timber manufacturer in Chile that will stimu-
late the Chilean economy by exporting timber products worldwide. The 
American company satisfies all government regulations, obtains the req-
uisite permits, and invests millions of dollars to construct the facilities 
for timber production and manufacturing. Months after the company 
commences operations, the Chilean government enacts environmental 
regulations that make it nearly impossible for the company to pursue its 
business objectives. The regulations require foreign-owned timber com-
panies to limit exports to a government-approved number and pay a 25 
percent assessment on all revenues to fund domestic research into sus-
tainable development projects. The American company believes that the 
new regulations damage the company’s investment by minimizing ex-
pected profits, while providing Chilean timber companies with an unfair 
advantage to carry out their business without being limited by the regula-
tions. Under international trade law, the American company would most 
likely pursue recourse through binding arbitration, bringing a claim 
against the Chilean government on the grounds that the government vio-
lated the company’s rights under the applicable trade agreement.  
While international trade agreements vary in their terms and con-
tent, foreign investors pursuing ISDS claims are generally permitted to 
elect to arbitrate before a variety of tribunals. The most commonly used 
forum for international investment arbitration is the International Center 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the second most 
commonly used forum is the United Nations Commission on Internation-
al Trade Law (UNCITRAL).36 Although each forum has its own set of 
rules, amendable by contract, the rules generally follow the same pattern 
and establish baseline requirements for each stage of arbitration, such as 
the proper method for filing pleadings, selecting a tribunal or challenging 
arbitrators, gathering evidence, and issuing a final award.37  
Nearly all free trade agreements provide investors with a private 
right of action through ICSID arbitration, in accordance with the arbitra-
tion rules established by the ICSID or UNCITRAL.38 Under both the 
ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, consent to arbitration occurs when a sov-
                                                
36 Id. at 138.  
37 Franck, supra note 14, at 22-3. 
38 Kate M. Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing 
Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L. J. 343, 351 (2009).  
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ereign state signs a free trade agreement that contains an ISDS provision 
allowing investors from another state to submit claims against it, such as 
in the timber manufacturer example discussed above.39 The standard 
ISDS tribunal is comprised of three arbitrators, one appointed by each 
party to the dispute and the third appointed by the party-selected arbitra-
tors.40 Where an investment dispute is submitted under either the ICSID 
or UNCITRAL rules, as a default position, tribunals are required to de-
cide disputes in accordance with the host state’s domestic laws and the 
applicable “rules of international law.”41 Under both the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL rules, much deference is given to the arbiters in almost eve-
ry aspect of the proceeding.  
C. Free Trade Agreements: Substantive Rules and Principles 
 Arguably the most ambitious and controversial characteristic of 
free trade agreements, in terms of both their purposes and goals, is their 
attempt to strike a balance between protecting the rights of foreign inves-
tors and maintaining a narrow police powers carve-out for participating 
governments. On one hand, the overwhelming majority of trade agree-
ments include provisions that promote non-discrimination and require 
host states to compensate investors in the event that expropriation or reg-
ulatory measures negatively impact the value of the investor’s invest-
ment. On the other hand, most trade agreements also protect host-states 
from compensating investors if the government’s conduct falls within the 
scope of the police powers carve-out for regulations designed to protect 
the public good. Additionally, as seen in the more recent trade agree-
ments such as the TPP, drafters may even include specific provisions that 
address the environment and specifically the host’s right to regulate in 
this area.42  
                                                
39 Id. at 352.  
40 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Diana Rosert, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Oppor-
tunities to Reform Arbitral Rules and Processes, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/investment_treaty_arbitration.pdf. 
41 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, art. 42, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
The United States is a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention. A list of signatories is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028012a925. The enabling legislation 
in the United States is embodied in 22 U.S.C. §§1650, 1650a (1982).  
42 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Chapter 
9, Article 9.10(3)(d), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf 
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At the most basic level, trade agreements provide two areas of 
protection for investors and one for the government. The first level of 
protection offered to investors is found in expropriation clauses, which 
prohibit host-states from expropriating or nationalizing an investor’s in-
vestment. These clauses appear in almost all of the more than 2,200 bi-
lateral and multilateral trade agreements, including NAFTA, the Domini-
can Republic – Central American Free Trade Agreement, and the TPP.43 
The second level of protection offered to investors is comprised in three 
extremely common non-discrimination provisions, namely the “National 
Treatment,” “Most-Favored-Nation,” and “Minimum Standard of Treat-
ment” clauses.44 Under the “National Treatment” clause, host-states must 
treat foreign investors no less favorably than domestic investors in simi-
lar circumstances.45 In a similar vein, the “Most-Favored-Nation” clause 
guarantee investors treatment at least as good as that received by inves-
tors from any other foreign country.46 The “Minimum Standard of 
Treatment” clause simply reiterates that investors are guaranteed “fair 
and equitable treatment.”47  
The most explicit protection provided for host-state governments 
is found in the form of exceptions to expropriation clauses. Under most 
free trade agreements, the host-state has the right to regulate for a public 
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, so long as compensation is du-
ly paid to investors.48 While this has traditionally been the full extent of 
the police powers carve out, modern ISDS jurisprudence has acknowl-
edged that certain non-discriminatory regulations, when exercised within 
the state’s police powers, might not require compensation when the gov-
ernment is acting solely in the public interest.49 Furthermore, there is cer-
tainly an argument to be made that modern trade agreements have ex-
panded the boundaries on what qualifies as a non-compensatory regula-
tion by explicitly including provisions recognizing a host’s ability to reg-
ulate on public welfare objectives, such as public health and the envi-
ronment.  
Having generally established the international trade law frame-
work for the ISDS system, the following section will discuss and com-
pare the rights reserved for both investors and host-states under NAFTA 
                                                                                                         
TPP, Article 9.10(3)(d). 
43 See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1110, 1106, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; TPP, supra note 42, art. 9.8. 
44 Anthony B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why are We Exporting the Penn Cen-
tral Test, 30 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L LAW & BUSINESS 339, 355-7. 
45 Id. at 355. 
46 Rahim Moloo and Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability 
under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW. 1, 57 (2011). 
47 NAFTA, supra note 44, art. 1105(1); see Sanders, supra note 45, at 356-7. 
48 Moloo, supra note 47, at 11.  
49 Id. at 16. 
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and the TPP. This comparative analysis will provide another layer of 
foundation to the ISDS debate concerning the potentially damaging or 
beneficial impacts ISDS may have on a host-state’s ability to protect the 
environment. 
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: NAFTA AND THE TPP 
This section develops a comparative analysis between NAFTA 
and the TPP, which will provide the foundation for analyzing whether 
environmental regulations will thrive or be chilled under the TPP. Be-
cause the TPP has largely been modeled after NAFTA, including the 
ISDS provision, many of the criticisms surrounding the TPP are based on 
the presumption that the TPP will follow in NAFTA’s footsteps.  
A. The North American Trade Agreement 
In ratifying NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the United States re-
solved to “ensure a predictable commercial framework for business 
planning and investment,”50 “increase substantially investment opportu-
nities in their territories,”51 and “create effective procedures for . . . the 
resolution of disputes.”52 Chapter 11 of NAFTA, arguably one of the 
most well known Investment Chapters of any free trade agreement, iden-
tifies the standards for treatment of investors and establishes procedures 
for arbitration of investor-state disputes. If an investor chooses to move 
forward with arbitration, the proceedings employ rules from either 
UNCITRAL or ICSID.53 Under NAFTA, respondent states are responsi-
ble for the actions of both the state and their subdivisions that amount to 
a violation of any of the investor rights contained in Chapter 11.  
1. Non-Discrimination 
The first five guarantees in Chapter 11 of NAFTA provide inves-
tors with substantive non-discrimination rights. Articles 1102 and 1103 
require NAFTA parties to treat each others’ investors in accordance with 
the relative standards of “National Treatment” and “Most-Favored-
Nation” treatment.54 Article 1104 reaffirms that parties must accord in-
vestors and their investments the “better treatment” required by Articles 
1102 and 1203,55 while Article 1105 establishes a “Minimum Standard of 
                                                
50 NAFTA, supra note 44, at Preamble, para. 6. 
51 Id. art. 102(1)(c). 
52 Id. art. 102(1)(e). 
53 Id. art. 1117(1). “An investor of a Party, on behalf of an enterprise of another Party that is a 
juridical person that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration 
under this Section a claim that the other Party has breached an obligation.” 
54 Id. arts. 1102, 1103.  
55 Id. art. 1104.  
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Treatment,” mandating treatment in accordance with customary interna-
tional law, including fair and equitable treatment.56  
Article 1106 contains the fifth guarantee under Chapter 11, and 
is also where NAFTA’s first reference to a fairly indiscrete police power 
carve-out is located. Article 1106 expressly prohibits certain “Perfor-
mance Requirements,” including requirements to export a given level or 
percentage of goods or services, or to achieve a given level or percentage 
of domestic content.57 Following an extensive list of requirements, com-
mitments, or undertakings that would constitute an illicit performance 
requirement under the agreement, the final paragraph of Article 1106 
states that “nothing . . . shall not be construed to prevent any Party from 
adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental measures,” 
that are “(a) necessary to secure compliance with the laws and regula-
tions that are not inconsistent with . . . this Agreement; (b) necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health; or (c) necessary for the 
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.”58  
2. Expropriation and Compensation 
Articles 1110 and 1106 comprise NAFTA’s expropriation re-
gime. Article 1110 explicitly permits expropriation and measures tanta-
mount to expropriation so long as the host-state’s conduct was done sole-
ly for a public purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with 
due process of the law and the minimum standard of treatment required 
under Chapter 11, and upon prompt compensation equal to the fair mar-
ket value for the expropriated investment.59 Given the “public purpose” 
and “fair market value” requirements, Article 1110 has been described as 
strikingly similar to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, with the “public purpose” requirements taken directly 
from the text and the “fair market value” imported from Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.60  
3. Arbitration Rules and Procedures 
Section B of Chapter 11 secures the obligations under Section A 
by “establish[ing] a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes 
that assures both equal treatment among investors and the Parties . . . and 
due process before an impartial tribunal.”61 Thus, under Section B, 
NAFTA parties have consented to investor-state arbitration; their consent 
                                                
56 Id. art. 1105(1).  
57 Id. art. 1106(1)(a)-(b), 1106(3)(b).  
58 Id. art. 1106(6).  
59 Id. art. 1110(1)-(6).  
60 Jordan C. Kahn, A Golden Opportunity for NAFTA, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 380, 412-13 
(2008).  
61 NAFTA, supra note 43, art. 1115.  
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represents a standing offer to foreign investors to resolve their disputes 
via binding arbitration under the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules.62  Alt-
hough the arbitration rules selected by the investor will govern the pro-
ceedings, Section B modifies the rules by creating a limited right of au-
dience for non-disputing NAFTA Parties, identifying the proper law for 
Chapter 11 disputes, and imposing strict limits on the form of interim 
and final relief that Chapter 11 tribunals may award.63 In their final 
awards, tribunals may only grant compensatory damages plus interest, 
restitution of property, and the cost of arbitration.64   
B. The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
According to the website recently launched by the U.S. Trade 
Office for the sole purpose of explaining and clarifying the TPP, the pur-
pose of the treaty’s ISDS provision is to strengthen the rule of law in the 
Asia-Pacific region, deter foreign governments from imposing discrimi-
natory or abusive requirements on American investors, and to protect the 
right to regulate in the public interest.65 To accomplish these objectives, 
the TPP’s Investment Chapter ensures that American investors will have 
effective remedies in the event of breach of their rights through the ISDS 
system.66  
1. Non-Discrimination 
Chapter 9, Section A of the TPP contains non-discrimination 
rules that are almost identical to the rights contained in the text of 
NAFTA, specifically the rights of “National Treatment,” “Most Favored 
Nation,” and “Minimum Treatment.”67 According to Article 9.4, the right 
of “National Treatment” requires member states to treat foreign investors 
no less favorably than the state treats its own investors in similar circum-
stances.68 Article 9.5 is the TPP’s “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment” 
provision, according to which “[e]ach party shall accord to investors of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords . . . to investors 
of any other party.”69 Finally, Article 9.6 establishes the right to a mini-
mum standard of treatment, requiring host-states to treat foreign invest-
                                                
62 Brower, supra note 16, at 48.  
63 See NAFTA, supra note 43, arts. 1120(2), 1127, 1129; see also id. at 51.  
64 See id. art. 1135(1). 
65 USTR, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Ch. 9, available at https://medium.com/the-trans-
pacific-partnership/investment-c76dbd892f3a. 
66 Id.at Chapter Summary. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. art. 9.4. 
69 Id. art. 9.5. 
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ments in accordance with customary international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment, and full protection and security.70  
Although the TPP largely resembles NAFTA in this area, the 
TPP expands upon NAFTA’s rules of non-discrimination by clarifying 
key concepts in the non-discrimination and minimum standard of treat-
ment obligations. In particular, the TPP clarifies that a legitimate public 
welfare objective is significant in the non-discrimination analysis. The 
TPP also expands upon NAFTA’s performance requirements provisions 
in important ways. Similarly to NAFTA, the TPP prohibits certain per-
formance requirements, such as requirements to export a given level or 
percentage of goods or services, to accord preference to goods produced 
in a signatory’s territory, or achieve a certain level of domestic content. 
However, unlike NAFTA, the TPP adds a new element of protection for 
governments by permitting parties to adopt certain performance require-
ments, including environmental measures. According to the performance 
requirements provision, provided that the government measures are not 
applied in an arbitrary or unjustified manner, and do not constitute a 
“disguised restriction or international trade or investment,” host-states 
are not prevented from adopted or maintaining measures, “including en-
vironmental measures”:  
(i) Necessary to secure compliance with laws and regula-
tions that are not inconsistent with this Agreement; 
(ii) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; or 
(iii) Related to the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.71 
 
In regards to the non-discrimination analysis and performance require-
ments, TPP expands NAFTA’s police power carve-out by acknowledg-
ing the importance of public welfare objectives and allowing for host-
states to adopt or maintain environmental measures as performance re-
quirements.  
2. Expropriation and Compensation 
Similarly to NAFTA, the TPP permits expropriation for a public 
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process 
of law, and upon prompt payment of adequate and effective compensa-
tion.72 Where the TPP differs, however, is in its further elaboration upon 
this right. The TPP provides stronger safeguards to host-states by under-
scoring that countries can regulate in the public interest, including health, 
                                                
70 Id. art. 9.6. 
71 Id. art. 9.9(1) and art. 9.10(3)(d).  
72 Id. art. 9.7.  
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safety, financial stability, and environmental protection. According to 
Annex 9-B, “Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations, except in rare circumstances.”73  
3. General Welfare Regulatory Objectives 
Unlike NAFTA, Article 9.16 of the TPP preserves the right for 
participating governments to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure, 
otherwise consistent with Chapter 9, which the government considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity within its territory is under-
taken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health and other regulatory 
objectives.74 Although this marks a significant departure from NAFTA, 
Article 9.15 only speaks to environmental or regulatory measures that are 
consistent with the TPP’s Investment Chapter, which does appear to 
place the right to enact such legislation as secondary to the rights afford-
ed to investors. Even so, Article 9.15 is notable because it is an inde-
pendent acknowledgement of a host-state’s right to regulate investment 
activity for environmental, health, and other general welfare purposes.   
4. Arbitration Rules and Procedures 
 Finally, the TPP further diverges from NAFTA in regards to its 
procedural requirements for ISDS claims. The TPP raises the procedural 
standards by explicitly discouraging and requiring the dismissal of frivo-
lous suits, and clarifying that the claimant initially bears the burden of 
proving all elements of its claims.75 Additionally, the TPP departs from 
the generally inaccessible and closed-off nature of ISDS tribunals under 
NAFTA by requiring arbitration proceedings to be fully open and trans-
parent, and allowing for the participation of civil society organizations 
and other parties not a direct party to the dispute.76 If a party brings forth 
a preliminary question on the legal merit of a claim, the TPP also permits 
arbiters to award the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and at-
torney’s fees.77 In regards to the final award, the arbiters have the final 
say in how the tribunal should award costs and attorney’s fees incurred 
by the disputing parties in connection with the proceeding.78  
Having established a comparative framework of the differences 
and similarities between NAFTA and the TPP, the following section will 
                                                
73 Id. annex 9-B. 
74 Id. art. 9.16. 
75 Id. art. 9.23. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. art. 9.22(6).  
78 Id.  
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examine several ISDS cases brought under NAFTA and, specifically, 
involving claims that the host-state’s environmental regulations im-
pinged on the investor’s rights. Is the NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence 
as pro-investor as ISDS opponents maintain? If so, given the similarities 
and differences between the Investment Chapters in NAFTA and the 
TPP, will future ISDS claims brought under the TPP produce the same 
results as cases brought under NAFTA? 
IV. NAFTA’S ISDS JURISPRUDENCE: INVESTOR RIGHTS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
Although the decisions made by investment arbitration tribunals 
are not binding as precedent, each decision does, in fact, contribute to the 
growing body of arbitral jurisprudence that continues to guide the inter-
pretation of the substantive principles of investment protection.79 Invest-
ment treaty tribunals might use precedent in different ways, either citing, 
following, or distinguishing cases from earlier arbitral awards, but what 
has emerged is a static and constantly evolving overarching regime for 
international investment relations.  
In the several decades that have passed since the emergence of 
NAFTA, foreign investors have pursued their fair share of ISDS cases 
under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter. Over the years, the accumulation 
of ISDS cases has produced a considerable amount of arbitral jurispru-
dence, which has become increasingly relevant in the current debate over 
whether the ISDS provision in the TPP is likely to produce the same re-
sults as ISDS claims under NAFTA. Given the striking similarities and 
significant differences between NAFTA and the TPP, this section will 
discuss four popularly cited investment cases brought under NAFTA in 
an effort to build an understanding of NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence 
and extrapolate doctrine that will likely be applicable to future claims 
brought under the TPP. The cases discussed in this section involved envi-
ronmental regulations and claims by foreign investors that the regula-
tions violated their treaty-based rights.  
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada is one of the first settled, and most 
popularly cited, NAFTA Chapter 11 cases.80 In 1996, Ethyl Corp., an 
American corporation, initiated a Chapter 11 action against Canada fol-
lowing Canada’s adoption of a law banning the import of the gasoline 
additive MMT.81 Ethyl, which was the sole supplier of MMT in Canada, 
                                                
79 Stephan Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12 GER. 
L. J. 1083, 1095 (2011). 
80 Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, UNCITRAL (1976), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0300_0.pdf. 
81 Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on 
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claimed the Canadian government’s ban on MMT violated the national 
treatment, performance requirements, and expropriation provisions under 
NAFTA. First, Ethyl argued the MMT ban violated the national treat-
ment requirement in Article 1102 on the grounds that the ban on MMT 
imports discriminated against MMT in favor of Canadian producers of 
alternative octane enhancers.82 Second, Ethyl asserted that the ban on 
MMT also created a de facto performance requirement, prohibited under 
Article 1106, to use Canadian sourced MMT or a Canadian produced 
alternative.83 Finally, under the prohibition against expropriation, Ethyl 
argued that the ban on importing MMT erased about 50 percent of the 
corporation’s business in Canada, constituting a de facto expropriation of 
its assets, good will, and future earnings.84   
In response to Ethyl’s claims, the Canadian government argued 
that the ban was motivated by health risks associated with manganese 
emissions as well as air quality concerns.85 Additionally, Canada noted 
that the much of the United States and Europe had also banned the use of 
MMT as a gasoline additive. Ultimately, Canada’s decision to ban the 
import and transport of MMT, as opposed to banning its use, weakened 
the government’s position that health and environmental concerns were 
truly the primary motivations behind the regulation; the MMT ban clear-
ly permitted domestic corporations to continue using and potentially 
manufacturing MMT, so long as importation and interprovincial trans-
portation was not involved.  
The Ethyl case is commonly brought into the ISDS debate as ev-
idence supporting the assertion that investor-state arbitration essentially 
enables investors to compel governments to change their environmental 
laws if threatened with weighty arbitration fees and damages. Although 
no decision was ever reached by the Ethyl tribunal, anticipating that the 
UNCITRAL arbitration panel was likely to decide against it, the Canadi-
an government reversed the ban on MMT import and transport and paid 
Ethyl $13 million in legal fees and damages.86  While it is certainly true 
that NAFTA does not allow arbiters to require host-states to change their 
domestic laws, the result in the Ethyl case undoubtedly suggests that the 
mere opportunity to arbitrate disputes has the potential to influence gov-
ernmental decisions, particularly in the realm of environmental and 
health regulations. In essence, a host-state may decide that the potential 
costs of losing in arbitration greatly outweigh the costs of reversing the 
                                                
82 Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, paras. 19-21, NAFTA, UNCITRAL (1998). 
83 Id. at para. 45. 
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85 Id. at para. 10. 
86 Konrad von Moltke, The Need for an International Investment Regime, in TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT: DIFFICULT POLICY CHOICES AT THE INTERFACE 169 (Shahrukh Rafi Khan ed., 
2002). 
2017] Environmental Regulations and the TPP 95 
challenged regulation and negotiating a smaller settlement outside of ar-
bitration.   
In Metalclad v. Mexico, the claimant was a U.S. waste disposal 
company that had acquired property in the state of San Luis Potosi, Mex-
ico, to operate a landfill in 1993.87 Prior to the Metalclad’s acquisition of 
the waste disposal plant, Mexico and the state of San Luis Potosi had 
struggle to cope with the extreme amounts of hazardous waste being 
generated each year, and opened negotiations with Metalclad to build a 
new hazardous waste landfill for the San Luis Potosi area.88 The negotia-
tions resulted in Metalclad receiving approval from the Mexican gov-
ernment to proceed with developing the landfill, which Metalclad com-
pleted and opened on March 10, 1995.89 The dispute between Metalclad 
and the Mexican government arose shortly after the project’s completion. 
Initially, the city of Guadalcazar, where the landfill was located, denied 
Metalclad’s municipal construction permit, even though the permit had 
been approved thirteen months earlier.90 A few months later, following 
failed negotiations between Metalclad and the State of San Luis Potosi to 
resolve the permitting issues, the Governor of San Luis Potosi issued an 
Ecological Decree declaring a Natural Area for the protection of rare 
cactus, which effectively, and permanently, precluded the operation of 
the landfill.91 
Metalclad filed a Chapter 11 NAFTA complaint against the 
Mexican government in January 1997, asserting that the Mexican State 
of San Luis Potosi’s ecological zoning law prohibited Metalclad from re-
opening the waste disposal plant that it has recently purchased, therefore 
constituting an expropriation of Metalclad’s assets.92 Metalclad submit-
ted a claim for approximately $43 million on the grounds that actions of 
the local and state government wrongfully refused to permit Metalclad’s 
subsidiary to open and operate a hazardous waste facility that Metalclad 
had built.93 Perhaps the most important of Metalclad’s assertions was that 
it had invested in the property in response to the invitation of Mexican 
officials, and that the project had met all of the government’s relevant 
legal requirements.94 Metalclad based its claim in Article 1100 of 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, arguing that the ecological zoning law amounted 
to expropriation, or indirect expropriation, of Metalclad’s investment.  
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Applying the ICSID rules, the arbitration tribunal concluded that 
the Mexican government’s conduct amounted to an expropriation and 
awarded Metalclad $16.7.95 In its statement of award, the tribunal clari-
fied that “expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate 
and acknowledged takings of property … but also covert or incidental 
interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving 
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit of property ... ”96 The decision in Metalclad is 
notable because the tribunal seemingly adopted a broad interpretation of 
expropriation under Chapter 11, and held the Mexican government liable 
for the actions of its political subdivisions, namely the municipal agency 
charged with granting permits and the State governor who declared the 
ecological decree.97  
Five years after the Metalclad ruling, the arbitration tribunal in 
Methanex v. United States declared that governments were exempt from 
paying compensation for bona fide regulations for the public good.98 Me-
thanex Corporation, a Canadian marketer and distributor of methanol, 
contended that a California ban on the use or sale of the gasoline additive 
MTBE in California, which uses Methanol as an ingredient, expropriated 
parts of Methanex’s investments in the United States. According to Me-
thanex, the California ban on MTBE violated Article 1110 and of Chap-
ter 11, denying it fair and equitable treatment in accordance with interna-
tional law, and denying it National Treatment under Article 1102.99 Cali-
fornia, through the United States, claimed that the MTBE ban was enact-
ed to protect public health and to prevent water pollution.100 In response, 
Methanex contended that the regulations were not justified on environ-
mental grounds, but merely a creation of political lobbying by a major 
competitor in the gasoline additive market — the domestic ethanol indus-
try.101  
Applying the UNCITRAL rules and rejecting Methanex’s claim, 
the tribunal emphasized the absence of assurances against regulatory 
change:  
[A]s a matter of general international law, a nondiscrim-
inatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted 
in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter 
alias, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed ex-
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98 Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, Final Award, pt.IV, ch. F, 4 5-6 (NAFTA 
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propriatory and compensable unless specific commit-
ments had been given by the regulating government to 
the then putative foreign investor contemplating invest-
ment that the government would refrain from such regu-
lation.102 
 
Thus, in dismissing all of Methanex’s claims, the tribunal clarified that 
Chapter 11 did not foreclose upon the possibility of non-compensable 
regulations so long as the regulation enacted was done for the public 
good and in accordance with due process of law. Unlike Metalclad, 
where the government appeared to have misled the investor, no such lack 
of due process or transparency was at issue in the claim against Califor-
nia’s MBTE ban.  
In Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, having been frustrated in 
its efforts to mine a portion of the California desert in the vicinity of Na-
tive American sacred sites, a Canadian investor filed a Chapter 11 arbi-
tration claim against the United States, alleging injuries relating to a pro-
posed gold mine in southeastern California.103 According to Glamis, it 
had invested approximately $15 million in gold mining operations, and 
spent 13 out of the 15 million on the project after receiving favorable 
signals from various regulatory bodies; however, following its invest-
ment in the mining project, California enacted regulations requiring 
complete backfilling for all open-out mines in California and for mining 
projects located within “one mile of any Native American sacred site,” 
which Glamis contended constituted a violation of its rights under Chap-
ter 11.104 Glamis asserted that California and the Department of the Inte-
rior had “failed to approve the plan of operation and erected barriers that 
have effectively destroyed all economic value of Glamis Imperial’s es-
tablished mineral rights.”105  
The unanimous 355-page decision of the Glamis tribunal has 
made a particularly important contribution to NAFTA arbitration juris-
prudence. First, in addressing Glamis’ expropriation claim, the tribunal 
extensively analyzed the value of the mining project in light of the addi-
tional costs that would be required to meet the environmental criteria 
demanded by the California regulations, and concluded that the com-
plained of measures would not constitute a sufficient economic impact 
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on Glamis to effect an appropriation of its investment.106 The tribunal 
reiterated that the first factor in an expropriation claim analysis, namely 
sufficient economic impact, had not been met because the calculations 
from the enacted measures indicated that the project would maintain a 
significant position valuation.  
Finally, in addressing Glamis’ final claim, the tribunal concluded 
that Glamis had failed to meet the high threshold required to prove a 
breach of “fair and equitable standard”.107 The tribunal held that a viola-
tion of this right “must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross 
denial or justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete 
lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons 
…” 108 
Ultimately, both critics and proponents of ISDS find fodder for 
their arguments in the previous decisions of NAFTA tribunals, citing to 
examples of cases as either emblematic of the demise of environmental 
law or the strengthening of each host-states’ ability to regulate environ-
mental concerns unencumbered.109 While NAFTA’s earlier arbitral juris-
prudence arguably appeared to favor investors, a closer look at the facts 
and more recent cases reasonably suggests that perhaps an investor-
friendly reading of NAFTA jurisprudence is not entirely accurate. The 
facts of the earlier cases indicate that host-states could have done more to 
avoid misleading or disfavoring investors, and the more recent cases, 
such as Glamis, depict a much more challenging threshold for investors 
to meet if submitting a claim against a host-state’s environmental poli-
cies or regulations.   
Having established the historical and legal framework for ISDS, 
consisting of the ISDS system’s doctrinal, substantive, and procedural 
background, a comparative analysis between the Investment Chapters of 
NAFTA and the TPP, and the current state of NAFTA arbitration juris-
prudence, this discussion now turns to the substance of the ISDS debate. 
In considering the strongest arguments on each side of the debate, the 
question then becomes whether the ISDS provision in the TPP will serve 
to benefit the financial interests of foreign investors to the detriment of 
the local environment, or whether investment arbitration under the TPP 
has the potential to benefit both investors, host-states, and the environ-
ment.  
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V. THE ISDS DEBATE: SEARCHING FOR A MIDDLE GROUND 
Given the divisiveness of the ISDS debate, it is easy to engage in 
a discussion about ISDS provisions, NAFTA, or the TPP from one side 
of the debate or the other. However, the purpose of this discussion is to 
engage with the multiple dimensions of the ISDS system, ranging from 
its history to current arbitration jurisprudence, so the various arguments 
can be contextualized and considered objectively. This section seeks to 
bring together the differing perspectives about ISDS by addressing some 
of the strongest arguments and opinions from environmentalists and free 
trade advocates alike.  
A. Arguments Against ISDS 
The most common concerns about ISDS involve the legitimacy 
of arbitration tribunals, arbitrator accountability, costs, transparency, 
award consistency, and more generally the preferential treatment of the 
interests of corporations over those of states.110 For most critics, the 
vague substantive treaty standards, such as “national treatment” and 
“most favored nation,” in addition to the ISDS mechanism through 
which they are interpreted and applied, have given foreign investors 
greater rights than they would otherwise enjoy under domestic law.111 At 
the most basic level, critics view ISDS provisions as giving greater pow-
er to foreign investors than nations by permitting investors to file claims 
against governments and allowing multinationals to override environ-
mental government policy, as was seen in the Metalclad claim.112  
In allowing multinationals to override government regulations, 
critics argue ISDS provisions enable corporations to undermine state 
sovereignty. As described by Senator Bernie Sanders, the ISDS provision 
contained in the TPP undermines the sovereignty of the United States 
and “subverts democratically passed laws including those dealing with 
labor, health, and the environment.”113 Because ISDS enables foreign 
investors to challenge a host-state’s police powers, critics further argue 
that ISDS results in a “regulatory chill,” caused by the reluctance of host-
states to impose new regulations when there is a risk foreign investors 
will challenge the regulations with investment arbitration.114  
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Additionally, in determining whether the actions of the host-state 
constitutes a “regulatory taking” that requires compensation, or whether 
it falls within the host’s “police powers carve-out” for non-compensatory 
policies designed to protect the public good, an international arbitration 
tribunal may determine the criteria for a regulatory taking according to 
the trade agreement and relevant arbitral jurisprudence, which may differ 
from what qualifies as a regulatory taking under the host-state’s domestic 
laws. In this regard, some policies that would be exempt from compensa-
tion under domestic law may be compensatory under the terms of the 
investment treaty or prior arbitral decisions. Therefore, according to crit-
ics, the inclusion of an ISDS provision in trade agreements arguably 
gives foreign investors greater protections than those available under 
domestic law.  
In regards to the financial benefits allegedly stimulated by free 
trade agreements and received by developing countries, some scholars 
argue that there is little conclusive evidence that free trade agreements 
actually promote foreign direct investment as proponents contend.115 Fur-
thermore, there is a similar lack of conclusive evidence that foreign in-
vestors actually need greater protections than domestic laws provide; 
while historically concerns about the impartiality of domestic judicial 
systems and politics may have been a valid concern, there appear to be 
little research or evidence to support this today.116 In this regard, if inves-
tors and states are truly concerned about bias, it seems ironic that what 
appears to assuage their fears is a dispute resolution system that lacks 
uniformity, impartiality, and consistency. In the views of many, “the al-
leged neutrality of arbitration is . . . a myth.”117   
Critics of ISDS have suggested a range of ways to avoid these 
difficulties. The first is obviously to remove ISDS provisions from future 
agreements entirely. Stemming from this suggestion, in absence of ISDS, 
investors have access to political risk insurance that protects them from 
losses arising out of expropriation, breach of contract, and denial of jus-
tice; the same types of losses that are covered under investment treaties. 
In general, critics of ISDS contend that the system as a whole should be 
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removed from its current stature as a supposed facilitator of international 
trade.  
B. Arguments in Favor of ISDS 
According to proponents of ISDS, arbitration provisions are a 
necessary and beneficial aspect of the international community’s increas-
ingly globalized trade regime. ISDS provisions strengthen the rule of law 
by requiring host-states to comply with their obligations and providing 
legal remedies for disputes, deters governments from imposing discrimi-
natory or abusive requirements on foreign investors, and protects the 
rights of governments to regulate in the public interest by reserving the 
police power carve-out in both NAFTA and the TPP.118 Essentially, pro-
ponents argue that the ISDS system simply gives foreign investors much 
needed redress if they are treated unfairly; by protecting the rights of for-
eign investors, free trade agreements make host-states more credible and, 
resultantly, promote foreign direct investment in less developed and ac-
cessible local economies. Counter to the assertion that ISDS results in a 
“regulatory chill,” proponents argue that an international trade system 
without ISDS would result in an “investment chill” much to the detri-
ment of the international community. Because ISDS provisions encour-
age foreign investors to invest in countries without robust legal systems, 
thereby fueling economic growth, foreign investments without the guar-
antee of investment arbitration would act as an important disincentive for 
continued foreign investment in the future.   
In response to the argument that ISDS undermines state sover-
eignty, proponents counter that entering into international treaties of any 
kind is a core exercise of sovereign responsibility, rather than an abdica-
tion of sovereignty. States have historically negotiated and selected the 
terms of international agreements as an exercise of sovereignty. Further-
more, states have also consistently entered into a large variety of treaties, 
including trade and investment agreements, because it is not just a na-
tion’s sovereign right to do so, but also the nation’s sovereign duty. In 
this regard, investment treaty arbitration ensures that states honor their 
obligations to other nations and to their foreign investors, thereby 
strengthening the rule of law both domestically and internationally. 
Looking to the text of the Investment Chapters in NAFTA and 
the TPP, there is a strong argument to be made that the TPP significantly 
departs from the NAFTA arbitration regime. First, unlike NAFTA, the 
TPP explicitly states that a host-state’s legitimate public welfare objec-
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tives may qualify as exceptions to the host-state’s non-discrimination and 
minimum standard of treatment obligations. For example, the TPP pro-
vides stronger safeguards to host-states by underscoring that countries 
can regulate in the public interest, and by permitting host-states to adopt 
certain performance requirements, such as environmental measures, that 
are necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, or are re-
lated to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible resources. 
Second, the TPP also raises the procedural bar for foreign investors by 
explicitly stating that frivolous suits will be dismissed, clarifying that the 
claimant bear the burden of proving all elements of its claim at the outset 
of the proceeding, requiring transparency, and permitting the participa-
tion of civil society organizations. In general, the text of the TPP does in 
fact differ from NAFTA is significant ways, particularly where the host-
state police powers are concerned.  
Finally, when specifically looking at NAFTA arbitral jurispru-
dence, ISDS cases are generally quite rare and corporations do not al-
ways come out victorious when arbitrating environmental claims. While 
foreign investors are permitted to sue host-state governments for a num-
ber of reasons under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, recent NAFTA ju-
risprudence has clarified that governments will not be held liable for just 
any insignificant monetary loss, and that the threshold for establishing a 
Chapter 11 claim requires an egregious breach of the investor’s rights.119 
Furthermore, in many of the cases where host-states have been required 
to pay damages to foreign investors, the host-state government generally 
made prior commitments to the foreign investor, which misleads the in-
vestor into believing that the investment was protected. Building upon 
this jurisprudence, the Metalclad tribunal emphasized that a nondiscrim-
inatory regulation is not compensable unless the government has given 
specific commitments to the foreign investor that it would refrain from 
such regulation.120 In light of NAFTA’s recent jurisprudence, ISDS pro-
visions arguably strengthen domestic environmental regimes by requir-
ing governments to forecast and plan around environmental regulations 
before approving any plans submitted by potential foreign investors.  
C. Comparing the Arguments 
Considering these arguments together, it is clear that the debate 
between environmentalists and advocates of free trade is incredibly chal-
lenging because there are valid arguments on each side of the spectrum. 
On one hand, it is generally true that investor arbitration provides foreign 
investors, mainly multinational corporations, the ability to challenge le-
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gal and regulatory systems and policy choices of the contracting states. 
Furthermore, early NAFTA jurisprudence attests to the fact that ISDS 
has been used to influence the ability of states to govern in the public 
interest, as seen in the Metalclad case. However, it is also true that it is 
the sovereign duty of states to enter into international treaties, and a ro-
bust investment arbitration system will likely reinforce the rule of law. In 
regards to NAFTA’s troubling history, the more recent environmental 
claims indicate that investors challenging environmental, health, and 
safety regulations must meet a fairly high threshold to establish that a 
government’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or would otherwise 
violate investment guarantees. Additionally, because the text of the TPP 
differs from NAFTA in that it does provide host-states with greater flex-
ibility when it comes to environmental regulations, it is entirely possible 
that investors will face increasing difficulties in establishing a claim 
against host-states under the TPP.  
In seeking to resolve the ISDS debate, it is the opinion of this au-
thor that the TPP has the potential to further the interests of both envi-
ronmentalists and free trade advocates, through both its text and by 
building upon NAFTA jurisprudence. 
D. Proposed Reforms 
A comparative analysis of the texts of NAFTA and the TPP sug-
gests many similarities, but a few important distinctions. As it relates to 
this discussion, the TPP mindfully addresses the ability of governments 
to regulate in the public interest, and includes several new provisions that 
specifically address environmental rights and protections. In regards to 
procedural changes, the TPP also explicitly places the burden of bringing 
the case against the government on the claimant, who must prove all el-
ements of its claims. Additionally, unlike NAFTA, TPP permits govern-
ments to seek expedited review and dismissal of claims that are “mani-
festly without legal merit.”121 The final portion of this discussion will 
suggest a few additional measures that would transform the current in-
vestment arbitration system into one that can simultaneously pursue 
goals of environmental protection and foreign economic growth.  
First, the international community should work towards develop-
ing one harmonized set of rules governing investment arbitration, in con-
trast to the currently fragmented system that permits investors to use a 
variety of different arbitration rules, such as UNCITRAL or ICSID. The 
multitude of free trade agreements, investment arbitration rules, arbitra-
tion forums, and arbiters themselves, clouds the entire investment arbi-
tration system with confusion and inconsistency. The investment com-
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munity should work towards developing a model international invest-
ment law, which would include a unified collection of the common rights 
provided to investors, obligations of host-states, and a clear description 
of the police power carve-out for governments. In addition to a model 
international investment law, model rules should also be created for in-
vestment arbitration proceedings, which would define unified procedural 
and jurisdictional requirements for ISDS cases.  
Second, as a procedural change, foreign investors should simply 
be required to carry the burden of paying the host-state’s legal fees if the 
arbitrators rule in the government’s favor. According to the UN Center 
on Trade and Development, which maintains a database of disputes arbi-
trated under ISDS provisions for all free trade agreements on record, of 
the forty-six cases that involved environmental disputes, seven were 
awarded in favor of the investor, four in favor of the state, twenty-five 
were settled, twenty-four are pending, and three are unknown.122 These 
facts clearly indicate that a disproportionate number of these claims are 
being settled, likely the result of the prolonged length of these cases, and 
arbitration and attorneys’ fees generally being extremely high. The fear 
is that governments without ample resources will settle with investors 
purely to avoid the costs incurred from arbitration. To diminish the grow-
ing trend in settlements, investment arbitration should require the losing 
party to pay all attorneys’ fees, while splitting the arbitration fees with 
the other party. This procedural requirement has the potential to deter 
corporations from pursuing frivolous lawsuits, and encourage govern-
ments to refrain from reaching quick and expensive settlements.  
Finally, addressing substantive reforms, legitimate environmen-
tal regulations should be recognized as a non-compensable regulatory 
taking, in both the text of free trade agreements and within customary 
international law. While it is true that the TPP carves out a much broader 
police power for governments regulating in the public interest, environ-
mental regulations that are enacted out of this power should be explicitly 
recognized as non-compensable. For example, in the context of free trade 
agreements, drafters could include a provision that states environmental 
regulations are non-compensable and take precedence over the rights of 
foreign investors if that policy was found to be consistent with the find-
ings and recommendations of a recognized international environmental 
body, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or con-
sistent with governing principles of customary international law.  
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CONCLUSION 
A robust ISDS system has the potential to strengthen environ-
mental regulations and increase foreign investment, particularly when 
applied to free trade agreements, such as the TPP, that have already ex-
panded the power of host-states to regulate for environmental purposes. 
First, because NAFTA jurisprudence suggests that states might be liable 
under ISDS provisions if they renege upon “specific assurances” given to 
prospective investors, host-states should be encouraged to give more 
consideration to forecasting future environmental regulation before en-
tering into agreements with investors.123 Second, the expropriation provi-
sion in NAFTA and the TPP does not require compensation for all gov-
ernment regulations, only those that are not for a public purpose and ad-
ministered in a discriminatory manner. Although this has been applied 
inconsistently to environmental regulations, NAFTA jurisprudence sug-
gests that environmental regulations that have been adopted openly and 
applied equally to all investors do not require compensation.  
In conclusion, if free trade agreements included a provision al-
lowing any environmental policy to take precedent over the rights of for-
eign investors if the policy was found to be consistent with the findings 
and recommendations of a recognized international environmental body, 
such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, governments 
would be more incentivized to engage with international recommenda-
tions and legislate in pursuit of environmental goals. For these three rea-
sons, in the context of ISDS, it is beneficial for governments to be forth-
right, transparent, informed, and proactive when implementing or even 
considering environmental regulations. 
                                                
123 Jordan C. Kahn, Striking NAFTA Gold: Glamis Advances Investor-State Arbitration, 33 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 101, 114 (2009).  
